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We develop a macroeconomic model with physical and human capital, human capital risk, and limited
contract enforcement. We show analytically that young (high-return) households are the most exposed
to human capital risk and are also the least insured. We document this risk-insurance pattern in data
on life-insurance drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finance. A calibrated version of the model
can quantitatively account for the life-cycle variation of insurance observed in the US data and implies
welfare costs of under-insurance for young households that are equivalent to a 4 percent reduction
in lifetime consumption. A policy reform that makes consumer bankruptcy more costly leads to a substantial
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For many households, human capital constitutes the single most important component of
their wealth. Empirical evidence suggests that human capital is distinguished by three char-
acteristics.1 First, ex ante returns to human capital investment vary greatly across the
population. Second, human capital investment is very risky due to uncertainty about lifes-
pan, health status, and labor market conditions. Third, human capital cannot be pledged as
collateral. In this paper, we explore the macroeconomic implications of these special char-
acteristics of human capital using a combination of theoretical, quantitative, and empirical
methods. We emphasize ﬁve main ﬁndings.
First, we show theoretically that these three properties of human capital generate an
interesting form of under-insurance, with the households that are most exposed to human
capital risk also the least insured relative to their insurance needs. Second, we provide
microeconomic evidence in support of this prediction by examining data on insurance against
an important form of human capital risk: the death of a household member. Speciﬁcally,
we use data on life-insurance contracts drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF)
and show that the extent of under-insurance is lowest for young households who also have
the greatest share of their wealth invested in human capital. Third, we show that when we
calibrate our model to life-cycle patterns in human capital returns, our model replicates the
observed quantitative pattern of under-insurance. Fourth, we show that this under-insurance
is important for welfare, with limitedaccess to insurance against human capital risk reducing
the welfare of young households by an amount equivalent to a 4 percent reduction in lifetime
consumption. Fifth, we show that this under-insurance has important implicationsfor policy:
making consumer bankruptcy as costly as defaulting on student loans leads to a substantial
increase in the volume of credit and insurance.
We begin our analysis by developing a macroeconomic model in which human capital
1The third characteristic is obvious. Section 6 discusses the empirical evidence on human capital risk and
heterogeneity of human capital returns.
1investments are risky, earn heterogeneous expected returns, and are not pledgeable as collat-
eral. Households can buy insurance and borrow using unsecured debt, with their ability to
borrow limited endogenously by the possibility that they might default. Default is modeled
along the lines of Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy code: in the case of default all debt
is cancelled, all ﬁnancial assets are seized, no future earnings are garnished, and access to
ﬁnancial markets is restricted for a period of time.
In a ﬁrst step, we consider a simpliﬁed version of our model and show analytically that the
equilibrium exhibits a negative relationship between risk and insurance: those households
who are most exposed to human capital risk are the ones who have the least insurance in
equilibrium. We show that this result holds for two diﬀerent insurance measures, one that
is deﬁned as the ratio of insurance pay-out relative to the income loss and another that
measures the reduction in consumption volatility due to insurance. Intuitively, households
with high ex-ante human capital returns choose to invest the bulk of their wealth in human
capital, that is, they are heavily exposed to human capital risk. In the absence of borrowing
constraints, these households would like to borrow in order to invest even more in human
capital and to buy insurance against human capital risk. However, the risk of bankruptcy,
combined with the fact that these households mainly hold non-collaterizable assets, prevents
them from borrowing and leaves them with little insurance in equilibrium.
In a next step, we turn to the quantitative analysis and study a calibrated version of the
full model in which ex-ante returns to investment in human capital vary by age: younger
households have higher human capital returns than older households. When we calibrate
the model economy to match the US evidence on labor market and mortality risk and the
life-cycle proﬁle of median earnings growth, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium a large number of
younger households are severely under-insured, but older households are almost completely
insured. Indeed, young households would gain around 4 percent of lifetime consumption from
being fully insured, but they would have to borrow to achieve this welfare improvement. In
short, the inability to pledge human capital generates large deviations from the full-insurance
2outcome for a large group of households.
Our analysis predicts that both human capital investment and the degree of under-
insurance should decrease over the life-cycle. In this paper, we examine these two im-
plications empirically using micro-level data drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finance
(SCF). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst measure the degree of under-insurance an important form of
human capital risks faced by a household: the death of a household member.2 When we
measure under-insurance using data on life-insurance purchases to estimate insurance pay-
outs relative to our estimate of the present value of lost earnings of the household, we ﬁnd
that under-insurance is strongly decreasing in age. We also show that this result is robust to
diﬀerent sample selections and modiﬁcations in the deﬁnition of under-insurance. Second,
when we measure the human capital choice of households in the data by computing the
ratio of net ﬁnancial wealth over labor income, we also ﬁnd that the fraction of total wealth
invested in human capital strongly decreases over the life-cycle. Moreover, the magnitude of
the decline in under-insurance and human capital over the life-cycle is in line with predic-
tions of our calibrated model economy. This provides additional corroboration of the theory
since the model has not been calibrated to match these two targets.
Finally, we argue that our approach has important macro-economic implications. There
has been a long-standing debate among academic scholars and policy makers with regard
to the relative merits of alternative consumer bankruptcy codes. In the US, this debate has
led to legislation making it more costly to declare bankruptcy. In this paper, we add to this
debate by exploring a channel that has not been studied by the previous macro literature on
consumer bankruptcy: making it more costly to declare bankruptcy not only increases the
volume of credit, but also the amount of insurance purchased by households. In the human
capital model analyzed here, it further increases economic growth since it leads to more
2One advantage of focusing on the market for life insurance is that other market imperfections, such as
adverse selection, are likely to be less important. Further, pure life-insurance contracts (term life insurance)
have a relatively simple structure and can in principle be purchased by most households.
3investment in the high-return asset. For the calibrated version of the model, we show that
these eﬀects are quantitatively substantial, though the positive growth impact is dampened
as a result of strong general equilibrium eﬀects.
In addition to these substantive contributions, this paper also makes a methodological
contribution by developing a tractable macro-economic model with risky human capital
and limited contract enforcement. Both theoretical and applied work on heterogeneous-
agent models with idiosyncratic risk and limited enforcement/commitment has struggled
with two fundamental problems. First, the inﬁnite-dimensional wealth distribution is in
general a relevant state variable when computing recursive equilibria. Second, in models
with investment, the choice of individual households is typically not convex, which calls into
question the application of any ﬁrst-order approach to the computation of equilibria. In
contrast, for the class of models developed in this paper, we show that the maximization
problem of individual households can be transformed into a convex problem and that the
inﬁnite-dimensional wealth distribution is not a relevant state variable.3 This property
allows us to show analytically our main result about risk and insurance, and is of great use
in quantitative work dealing with higher-dimensional state variables.
2. Literature
This paper is most closely relatedto the large literature on risk sharing in models with lim-
ited commitment/enforcement. See, for example, Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Kehoe and
Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), Thomas and Worrall (1988) for contributions based on
exchange models and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Krueger
and Perri (2006), and Wright (2001) for work on production models with capital. In addition
to our methodological contribution, which shows how to deal with the non-convexity issue
3In this paper, we focus on logarithmicone-period utilityfunctions, but it is easy to see that our characteri-
zation result holds more generally for CRRA utilityfunctions. Indeed, our basic argument uses homotheticity
of preferences, which means that the assumption of Epstein-Zin preferences is suﬃcient for the proof.
4in a certain class of production models, we make three substantive contributions to this
literature. First, we show that a calibrated macro model with physical capital and limited
contract enforcement can generate substantial lack of consumption insurance once we intro-
duce life-cycle considerations and human capital choices. In contrast, previous work in this
literature, which has not considered ex-ante heterogeneity and human capital choice, has
concluded that the eﬀects of limited enforceability of contracts on risk sharing are small in
calibrated macro models with physical capital and production.4 Second, we show that our
calibrated model economy provides a good quantitative account of the empirically observed
life-cycle proﬁle of human capital investment and consumption insurance. In particular,
we show that the model can quantitatively explain the “under-insurance” puzzle in the life-
insurance market. Finally, we introduce the human capital channel and show that our model
has important implications for macro-economic policy analysis.5
This paper is also related the literature on macro-economic models with incomplete mar-
kets. Most work in this literature has taken the human capital of individuals as exogenous,
but Krebs (2003), Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2011), and Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron
(2011) are three contributions that have explicitly dealt with human capital investment
when returns are uncertain and insurance markets are incomplete. Though these models
provide useful insights into a number of important issues, they are necessarily silent about
the underlying ﬁnancial friction that explains the observed lack of insurance and the limits
on borrowing. In particular, the standard incomplete-market model can in principle explain
why self-insurance increases with age,6 but it has nothing to say about the use of existing
insurance markets over the life-cycle. Moreover, our analysis of the personal bankruptcy
4Krueger and Perri (2006) match the cross-sectional distribution of consumption fairly well, but the
implied volatility of individual consumption growth is negligible in their model. A similar ”almost full-
insurance” result is obtained by Cordoba (2006).
5Andofatto and Gervais (2006) and Lochner and Monge (2011) analyze models with human capital
investment and endogenous borrowing constraints due to enforcement problems, but they abstract from risk
considerations and therefore cannot address the issues that take center stage in this paper.
6See, for example, Kaplan and Violante (2010).
5law heavily relies on the endogeneity of borrowing constraints and the existence of some
insurance markets.
Recent contributionsby Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007), and Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) analyze the consequences of reforming the consumer bankruptcy
code based on models with equilibrium default and no insurance markets. In these pa-
pers, an increase in the cost of bankruptcy increases borrowing and reduces default, which
leads to a reduction in risk sharing since default is a means towards smoothing consumption
across states of nature. In contrast, in our model an increase in the cost of bankruptcy
increases borrowing and improves risk sharing since households can take better advantage
of existing insurance markets. Moreover, our quantitative work shows that the increase in
equilibrium insurance is substantial. Clearly, neither our assumption of a complete set of
insurance markets nor the assumption of no insurance markets is a correct representation
of reality. Despite this caveat, our work makes a simple yet important point: any reform of
the consumer bankruptcy law is likely to aﬀect not only credit markets, but also insurance
markets.
There is an extensive literature analyzing insurance markets based on models of adverse
selection and moral hazard, and one basic implication of this approach is that households
with higher risk exposure should buy more insurance (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000, and Chi-
appori, Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie, 2006). A number of empirical studies have found that
this hypothesis is often rejected by the data (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000, and Bernheim,
Forni, Gokhale, and Kotlikoﬀ, 2003), and has dubbed this ﬁnding the “under-insurance puz-
zle”. In this paper, we provide additional evidence supporting the ﬁndings of the previous
literature and put forward an explanation of the puzzle for mortality risk in terms of limited
contract enforcement. Of course, there are alternative explanations of a negative relationship
between risk exposure and insurance based on adverse selection and preference heterogeneity
(Chiappori et al.., 2006, and Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry, 2008), but we are not aware
of any work in the macro literature that addresses this issue.
6At a very general level, models of limited enforcement/commitment have one basic im-
plication: in equilibrium, there is imperfect risk sharing if borrowing (short-sale) constraints
are binding. We are not aware of any empirical study directly testing this joint hypothe-
sis, but both the “perfect risk sharing hypothesis” and the “binding borrowing constraints
hypothesis” have been tested separately. On risk sharing, almost all empirical studies us-
ing household level data have found that the full-insurance hypothesis is strongly rejected
(Attanasio and Davis, 1996, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Peston, 2008, Cochrane, 1991, and
Townsend, 1994). On borrowing constraints, Jappelli (1990) ﬁnds that a signiﬁcant fraction
of US households are credit constrained, and that these households are on average younger
than the rest of the population. There is also an extensive empirical literature on credit
constraints and college enrollment, which has reached somewhat mixed results. For exam-
ple, Card (2001) concludes that borrowing constraints aﬀect college enrollment decisions
substantially, whereas Carneiro and Heckmann (2002) argue that only a small fraction of
the population is aﬀected. Lochner and Monge (2011) show that the number of aﬀected
individuals has increased signiﬁcantly since the 1980s.
3. Model
In this section, we develop the model and deﬁne a stationary (balanced growth) recursive
equilibrium.
3.1. Production
Time is discrete and open ended. There is no aggregate risk and we conﬁne attention to
stationary (balanced growth) equilibria. We assume that there is one all-purpose good that
can be consumed, invested in physical capital, or invested in human capital. Production
of this one good is undertaken by one representative ﬁrm (equivalently, a large number of
identical ﬁrms) that rents physical capital and human capital in competitive markets and
uses these input factors to produce output, Y , according to the aggregate production function
Y = F(K,H), where K and H denote the aggregate levels of physical capital and human
7capital, respectively. The production function, F, has constant-returns-to-scale, satisﬁes
a Inada condition, and is continuous, concave, and strictly increasing in each argument.
Given these assumptions on F, the derived intensive-form production function, f( ˜ K) =
F( ˜ K,1), is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisﬁes a corresponding
Inada condition, where we introduced the “capital-to-labor ratio” ˜ K = K/H. Given the
assumption of perfectly competitive labor and capital markets, proﬁt maximization implies
rk = f
′( ˜ K) (1)
rh = f( ˜ K) + f
′( ˜ K) ˜ K ,
where rk is the rental rate of physical capital and rh is the rental rate of human capital. Note
that rh is simply the wage rate per unit of human capital and that we dropped the time
index because of our stationarity assumption. Clearly, (1) deﬁnes rental rates as functions of
the capital to labor ratio: rk = rk( ˜ K) and rh = rh( ˜ K). Finally, physical capital depreciates
at a constant rate, δk, so that the (risk-free) return to physical capital investment is rk −δk.
3.2. Households
There are a continuum of long-lived households of mass one. Households have an uncertain
life-span and in the case of death they are replaced by new-born households. The exogenous
state of an individual household in period t is denoted by st. We assume that the process
of exogenous states, {st}, is Markov with stationary transition probabilities π(st+1|st). Note
that st can have several components (age, ability, mortality risk, labor market risk) and that
we can incorporate ex-ante heterogeneity (age, ability) by assuming degenerate transition
probabilities for certain components (see Sections 5 and 6 for particular applications). We
denote by st = (s1,...,st) the history of exogenous states up to period t (date-event, node)
and let π(st|s0) = π(st|st−1)...π(s1|s0) stand for the probability that st occurs given s0.
At time t = 0, the type of an individual household is characterized by his initial state,
(k0,h0,s0), where k0 denotes the initial stock of physical capital and h0 the initial stock of
human capital (note that s0 is not included in st). We take as given an initial distribution,
8 0, of households over initial states (k0,h0,s0), and a sequence of distributions, { t,new}, of
new-born households over initial states.
Households are risk-averse and have identical preferences that allow for a time-additive
expectedutility representationwith logarithmic one-period utilityfunction and pure discount
factor β. That is, for a household choosing the consumption plan {ct}, expected life-time









where ν is a preference shifter that in the event of death of the household (family ceases to
exists) is set to zero. Note that we have abstracted from the labor-leisure choice of house-
holds. Note also that with log-utility preferences, any deterministic change in household-size
simply adds a constant to (2) without changing the optimal choice of households.
Each household can invest in human capital and buy and sell a complete set of ﬁnancial
assets (contracts) with state-contingent payoﬀs. More speciﬁcally, there is one asset (Arrow
security) for each exogenous state s. We denote by at+1(st+1) the quantity bought (sold) in
period t of the asset that pays oﬀ one unit of the good in the next period if st+1 occurs in the
next period. Given his initial state, (h0,a0,s0), a household chooses a plan, {ct,ht+1,  at+1},
where the notation   a indicates that in each period the household chooses a vector of asset
holdings. Further, ct stands for the function mapping partial histories, st, into consumption
levels, ct(st), with similar notation used for the other choice variables. A budget-feasible
plan has to satisfy the sequential budget constraint




ht+1 = (1 − δh(st))ht + iht




ct ≥ 0 , ht+1 ≥ 0 ,
where qt(st+1) is the price of a ﬁnancial contract in period t that pays oﬀ if st+1 oc-
curs in t + 1. Note that in general prices depend on history and initial state, qt(st+1) =
9qt(st+1;st,a0,h0,s0), though in our Markov setting the prices can be written as q(st+1;st)
(see below). In (3) iht is investment in human capital and δh(st) is the age- and shock-
dependent depreciation rate of human capital. The term δh(st) captures all types of human
capital risk as well as ex-ante heterogeneity in human capital returns (see Sections 5 and 6).
Note that (3) has to hold in realization, that is, it has to hold for all t and all sequences {st}.
Note also that the ﬁrst inequality in (3) represents a debt constraint, which in our setting is
equivalent to a no-Ponzi-scheme condition.
In addition to the standard budget constraint, each household has to satisfy a sequential
enforcement (participation) constraint, which ensures that at no point in time individual
households have an incentive to default on their ﬁnancial obligations. More precisely, indi-








t+n|st) ≥ Vd(ht,st) , (4)
where Vd is the value function of a household who defaults. Note that (4) also has to hold
in realization. Note further that the constraint set deﬁned by (4) may not be convex since
both the left-hand side and the right-hand side are concave functions of h.
The default value function, Vd, is deﬁned by the following utility maximization problem.
The consequences of default are designed to mimic Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy code.
Upon default, all debts of the household are cancelled and all ﬁnancial assets seized so that
at(st) = 0. Following default, a household is excluded from participation in ﬁnancial markets
for a period of time. For tractability, we assume exclusion continues until a stochastically
determined future date that occurs with probability (1 − p) in each period; that is, the
probability of remaining in (ﬁnancial) autarky is p. Following a default, households retain
their human capital and continue to earn the wage rate (1−τh)rh per unit of human capital,
where τh denotes the fraction of labor income that is garnished from households in default.
In our baseline calibration, τh is set to zero as no wages are garnished under Chapter 7;
later we analyze the eﬀect of a reform of the bankruptcy code that allows for wages to be
10garnished (an increase in τh). After regaining access to ﬁnancial markets, the households
expected continuation value is V e(h,a,s), where (h,a,s) is the individual state at the time
of regaining access. For the individual household the function V e is taken as given, but we
will close the model and determine this function endogenously by requiring that V e = V ,
where V is the equilibrium value function associated with the maximization problem of a
household who participates in ﬁnancial markets.7 In summary, a household who defaults in




















where {ct+n,ht+n} has to solve the sequential budget constraint (2) with at = 0.
3.3 Equilibrium




1 + rk − δk
. (6)
The pricing equation (6) can be interpreted as a zero-proﬁt condition for ﬁnancial interme-
diaries that can invest in physical capital at the risk-free rate of return rk −δk and can fully
diversify idiosyncratic risk for each insurance contract st+1.
Below we show that the optimal plan for individual households is recursive, that is, the
optimal plan is generated by a policy function, g. This household policy function in conjunc-
tion with the transition probabilities, π, deﬁne a transition function over states, (h,a,s), in
the canonical way. The transition function over individual states (h,a,s) conjunction with
7In other words, we assume rational expectations. The previous literature has usually assumed p = 1
(permanent autarky), and therefore did not have to deal with this issue. See, however, Krueger and Uhlig
(2006) for a model with p < 1 following a similar approach to ours. Note also that the credit (default)
history of an individual household is not a state variable aﬀecting the expected value function, V e. Thus,
we assume that the credit (default) history of households is information that cannot be used for contracting
purposes.
11the initial distribution,  0, and sequence of distributions, { t,new}, induce a sequence of
equilibrium distributions, { t}, of households over individual states, (h,a,s). Assuming a
law of large numbers, aggregate variables can be found by taken the expectations with re-
spect to the induced equilibrium distribution. For example, the aggregate stock of human
capital held by all households in period t is given by Ht = E[ht] =
R
hd t(h). A similar
expression holds for the aggregate value of ﬁnancial wealth. In equilibrium, human capital
demanded by the ﬁrm must be equal to the corresponding aggregate stock of human capital
supplied by households. Similarly, the physical capital demanded by the ﬁrm must equal the
aggregate net ﬁnancial wealth supplied by households. Because of the constant-returns-to-
scale assumption, only the ratio of physical to human capital is pinned down by this market







where ˜ K is the capital-to-labor ratio chosen by the ﬁrm.
To sum up, we have the following equilibrium deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition A stationary recursive equilibrium is a collection of rental rates (rk,rh), an
aggregate capital-to-labor ratio, ˜ K, a household value function, V , an expected household
value function, V e, a household policy function, g, and a sequence of distributions, { t}, of
households over individual states, (h,a,s), so that
i) Utility maximization of households: for each initial state, (h0,a0,s0), and given prices,
the household policy function, g, generates a plan, {ct,ht+1,  at+1}, that maximizes expected
lifetime utility (2) subject to the sequential budget constraint (3) and the sequential partic-
ipation constraint (4).
ii) Proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms: aggregate capital-to-labor ratio and rental rates satisfy the
ﬁrst-order conditions (1).
iii) Financial intermediation: ﬁnancial contracts are priced according to (6)
iv) Aggregate law of motion: the sequence of distributions, { t}, is generated by g, π,  0,
12and { t,new}.
v) Market clearing: equations (7) holds for all t when the expectation is taken with respect
to the distribution  t.
vi) Rational expectations: V e = V .
3.4 Discussion
The budget constraint (3) follows Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo (1991) by assuming
that human capital and physical capital are produced using the same technology and that
there are no diminishing returns to investment at the household level (competitive markets).
In contrast, Lucas (1988) and Ben-Porath (1967) consider models with asymmetric produc-
tion structures and diminishing returns at the household level. There are also diﬀerences
with respect to the cost of human capital investment, where the former literature emphasizes
direct costs and the latter indirect costs that arise when households have to allocate a ﬁxed
amount of time between work and human capital investment. To see the relationship of
our approach to Ben-Porath (1967), note that a general formulation of the law of motion
of human capital of a household would be ht+1 = G(ht,xt,lt,st), where lt is time spent
investing in human capital. Ben-Porath uses G(h,l) = h+a(hl)α and Huggett et al. (2011)
add human capital (depreciation) shocks: G(h,l,s) = es(h + a(hl)α), where s is normally
distributed. Our formulation (3) assumes G(h,x,s) = (1 − δh(s))h+ x, but it is easy to see
that our general equilibrium characterization result (propositions 1 and 2) goes through if
G(h,x,l,s) = g1(l,s)h + g2(l,s)x, where g1 and g2 can be non-linear functions.8
We have chosen the speciﬁcation (3) for two reasons. First, it keeps the model highly
tractable, though a more general formulation of the type G(h,x,l,s) = g1(l,s)h + g2(l,s)x
would also deliver a tractability result. Second, it treats the production of physical and
human capital fully symmetricly, which seems a useful abstraction given that our focus is
on three properties of human capital that are per se unrelated to the production process,
8Formulation (3) makes another assumption that is very common in the literature, namely it lumps
together general human capital (education, health) and speciﬁc human capital (on-the-job training).
13namely that human capital is an asset that i) is risky, ii) has heterogeneous ex-ante returns,
and iii) cannot be seized upon default.
The budget constraint (3) introduces risk and ex-ante heterogeneity in returns by assum-
ing that the human capital depreciation rate depends on the exogenous state: δh = δh(s). It
is important to keep in mind that there is a formally equivalent formulation of the household
problem in which risk and ex-ante heterogeneity of human capital returns arises because the
productivity of human capital investment depends on s. More precisely, suppose that human
capital evolves according to ht+1 = (1 − ¯ δh) + z(st)xt, where z measures the productivity of
human capital investment, that is, the number of goods needed to produce one more unit of
human capital. It is straightforward to see that this formulation and formulation (3) lead to
the same budget constraint if we set z(st) =
h
(1 − ¯ δh)z(st−1)
i
[rh(1 − z(st−1) + (1 − δh(st))].9
Thus, our assumption in Section 6 that expected human capital returns are age-dependent
does not literally mean that depreciation rates are age-dependent. Moreover, our choice of
not imposing non-negativity constraint on human capital investment, which is essential for
our tractability result, is much less severe than suggested by formulation (3). To see the
last point, note that a non-negativity constraint on human capital investment in (3) means
ht+1/ht ≥ 1 − δh(st), whereas in the equivalent formulation with productivity diﬀerences it
reads ht+1/ht ≥ 1 − ¯ δh. Hence, if s has ﬁnite support, then for any solution to the house-
hold problem with budget constraint (3) we can ﬁnd an equivalent formulation with ¯ δh large
enough so that the solution automatically satisﬁes the non-negativity constraint on human
capital investment.
4. Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we show that recursive equilibria can be found without knowledge of the
9For this equivalence result to hold, we have to change the deﬁnition of returns and total wealth ac-
cordingly, and the portfolio choices in the denominator of the market clearing condition (13) have to be
multiplied by z.
14endogenous wealth distribution and provide a convenient characterization of recursive equi-
libria as the solution to a ﬁnite-dimensional ﬁxed-point problem. This characterization of
recursive equilibria is then used for the subsequent analysis.
4.1. Household Problem
Denote total wealth (human plus ﬁnancial) of a household at the beginning of the pe-
riod by xt = ht +
P
s at(s)q(s). Further, denote the portfolio shares by θht = ht/xt and
θat(st) = at(st)/xt, and the total investment return by 1+rt = (1+ rh −δh(st))θht +θat(st).
Using this notation, the budget constraint (3) becomes
xt+1 = (1 + r(θt,st))xt − ct




ct ≥ 0 , xt+1 ≥ 0 , θh,t+1 ≥ 0 .
Clearly, (8) is the budget constraint corresponding to an inter-temporal portfolio choice
problem with linear investment opportunities and no exogenous source of income. It also
suggest that (x,θ,s) is the relevant state variable for the recursive formulation of the utility
maximization problem. More speciﬁcally, the Bellman equation associated with the utility
maximization problem of a household facing the budget constraint (8) and the sequential
enforcement constraint (4) reads:


























c ≥ 0 , x








In contrast to the standard case without participation constraint, the Bellman equation (9)
may have multiple solutions. However, in the Appendix we show that there is a maximal
15solution to (9), and this solution is also the value function of the corresponding utility
maximization problem.
In the applications in Sections 5 and 6, we consider cases in which the exogenous state
has several components, st = (s1t,...,snt), and only the ﬁrst component, s1t (age, abil-
ity), exhibits serial correlation (predictive power), whereas the remaining components are
independently distributed over time. With this application in mind, let us assume that
π(st+1|st) = π(st+1|s1t). We further assume that the expected value function is logarithmic.
In this case, it is well-known that the default consumption policy function is linear in total
wealth and that the default value function is logarithmic (see Appendix for details), that is,
the optimal policy function is





′(x,θ,s) = β(1 + r(θ,s))x .
and the corresponding value function is given by
V (x,θ,s) = ˜ V (s1) +
1
1 − β
[ln x + ln(1 + r(θ,s))] , (11)
The intensive-form value function, ˜ V , and the optimal portfolio choices, θ′, are the solution
to
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16Note that the intensive-form value function, ˜ V , and optimal portfolio choices, θ, only depend
on the component of s that has predictive power (serial correlation), that is, ˜ V and θ are
independent of any i.i.d. component.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the expected value function, V e, is logarithmic. Then the
default value function, Vd, is logarithmic. Further, the value function, V , is logarithmic, that
is, it has the functional form (11) and the optimal policy function is given by (10), where
optimal portfolio choices and intensive-form value function are determined by the solution
to (12).
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark 1 The participation constraint in the maximization problem (12) is linear since the
investment return, r, is linear in the portfolio choice, θ. Thus, the choice set in the maxi-
mization problem in is convex, and the non-convexity problem alluded to in the introduction
has been solved in the context of the current model.
4.2. Intensive-form equilibrium
Deﬁne the share of aggregate total wealth of households of age s1 as
Ω(s1t) . =
E [(1 + rt)xt|s1t]π(s1t)
E[xt]
Note that (1+rt)xt is total wealth of an individual household after assets have paid oﬀ (after
production and depreciation has been taken into account). Note also that
P
s1t Ω(s1t) =
1. Further, Ω is ﬁnite-dimensional, whereas the set of distributions over (x,s) is inﬁnite-
dimensional. Using the deﬁnition of wealth shares and the property that portfolio choices
are wealth-independent, in the Appendix we show that the market clearing condition (7) is
















1(1 + ¯ r(s1,s′
1))Ω(s1)
, (14)
where we deﬁned the expected investment return conditional on current and future age, s1
and s′




−1 r(θ(s1),s′)π(s′|s1) with s−1 = (s2,...,sn). Note that π(s′|s1) =
π(s′|s′
1)π(s′
1|s1), which is the expression used in most applications.
In sum, we have
Proposition 2. Suppose that (θ, ˜ V , ˜ K,Ω) is a stationary intensive-form equilibrium, that
is, the portfolio choice θ together with the intensive-form value function ˜ V are the solution to
(12), the intensive-form market clearing condition (13) holds, and Ω satisﬁes the stationarity
condition (14). Then (g, ˜ V , ˜ K,{ t}) is a stationary recursive (balanced growth) equilibrium,
where g is the individual policy function deﬁned by (10) and { t} is the sequence of measures
recursively deﬁned by  0, g, and π.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark 2 Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium can be found without knowledge of the
inﬁnite-dimensional wealth distribution – only the lower dimensional distribution Ω matters.
Proposition 2 in conjunction with the characterization of the household problem stated in
proposition 1 show that the model is highly tractable.
5. Example
5.1 Set-Up
In this section, we conﬁne attention to an economy with exogenous state st = (s1t,s2t,s3t),
where the ﬁrst component denotes the type of the household (age, ability), the second compo-
nent represents human capital risk (health risk, labor market risk), and the third component
determines whether the household is alive. Note that the type of mortality risk analyzed in
Section 6, namely that a member of a multi-person household dies but the household con-
18tinues to exist, amounts to a shock to the human capital stock of a household and therefore
enters the household decision problem through the second component, s2t. We assume that
the ﬁrst component can take on two values, s1t ∈ {l,h} (low and high human capital returns),
and is fully persistent: π(s1,t+1|s1t) = 1 if s1,t+1 = s1t and π(s1,t+1|s1t) = 0 otherwise. We
further assume that human capital risk is an i.i.d. random variable, π(s2,t+1|s2t) = π(s2,t+1),
with two-state support, s2t ∈ {b,g} (bad and good shock). The human capital depreciation
rate of a household of type s1 with shock s2 is given by δh(s1,s2) = ¯ δh(s1) + η(s2). We
assume that the mean depreciation rate for the low-return household is high, ¯ δh(l) > ¯ δh(h),
and that human capital shocks have mean 0: η(b) > 0 and η(g) = −η(b)π(b)/π(g) < 0.
The third component takes on two values, s3t ∈ {n,d}, corresponding to death, s3t = d, or
no-death, s3t = n, of the household. We assume that death of the household is an absorbing
state, π(s3,t+1 = d|s3t = d) = 1, and denote the probability of death of a household by
pd = π(s3,t+1 = d|s3t = n), and normalize the utility in the death state to zero: ν(d) = 0. Fi-
nally, we assume that defaulting households are not excluded form ﬁnancial markets: p = 1,
which rules out short positions in ﬁnancial assets (see Appendix).
5.2 Consumption and Insurance
Using the policy function (10) of our equilibrium characterization result, we ﬁnd that con-
sumption growth is given by:
ct+1
ct









with an eﬀective discount factor ˜ β = β(1 − pd). Consumption growth depends on human
capital choice, θh(s1), ex-ante human capital returns, rh − ¯ δh(s1), ex-post shocks, η(s2,t+1),
and asset payoﬀs (insurance), θa(s1,s2,t+1).
Consider now a bad human capital shock of size η(b). Note that η(b) is the percentage of
human capital lost, which equals the percentage drop in permanent income. We deﬁne the
consumption drop associated with this drop in permanent income as the diﬀerence between
19the percentage decline in consumption and the mean consumption growth rate (conditional
on type). Using (15), we ﬁnd
consumption drop = ˜ β (η(b)θh(s1) − (θa(s1,b) − E[θa|s1])) , (16)
where E[θa|s1] = π(b)θa(s1,b) + π(g)θa(s1,g) is the mean holding of ﬁnancial assets of a
household of type s1. Note that η(b)θh is the human capital loss as a fraction of total
wealth, x, and θa(s1,b) − E[θa|s1] is the insurance pay-out as a fraction of total wealth.
When these two terms are equal, we have full insurance and the consumption drop is nil.
When there is no insurance pay-out, the consumption drop is ˜ βη(b)θh(s1), which is less than
the original drop in permanent income, η(b)θh(s1), as long as ˜ β < 1. In this sense, there is
self-insurance in the model.
In this paper, we consider two measures of insurance. Both capture the degree to which
households insure against human capital risk by purchasing insurance contracts.10 Our
ﬁrst insurance measure is deﬁned as the fraction of the income loss that is insured. More
precisely, we deﬁne it as the ratio of the insurance pay-out in the case of a bad shock,





The insurance measure I1 varies between 0 if θa(s1,b) = E[θa|s1], in which case we have no
insurance, and 1 if θa(s1,b) − E[θa|s1] = ηθh(s1).
Our second measure of insurance is based on the idea that insurance reduces consumption
volatility, where volatility is measured by the standard deviation of consumption growth.
More precisely, we deﬁne




10Blundell et al (2008) introduce an insurance coeﬃcient that measures the extent to which consumption
responds to income shocks. Clearly, their measure captures consumption insurance through self-insurance
and the explicit purchase of insurance contracts, whereas our approach conﬁnes attention to the latter
channel.
20where σ [ct+1/ct|s1] isthe standard deviationof equilibriumconsumption growth and σ [ca,t+1/ca,t|s1]
is the standard deviation of consumption growth in ﬁnancial autarky. Note that consump-
tion growth in ﬁnancial autarky is simply given by (15) with θs(s1,s2,t+1) = 0. If we assume
a symmetric shock distribution, π(b) = π(g) = 1/2, we can show that the insurance measure
I2 varies between 0 and 1.
Proposition 3. Consider the simple economy described above. In equilibrium, household
with high ex-ante human capital returns, s1 = h, invest more in human capital and have less




where the last inequality, I2(h) ≤ I2(l), holds under the additional assumption of a symmetric
shock distribution. The inequalities are strict if in equilibrium there is some insurance, but
not full insurance.
6. Quantitative Analysis
Section 6.1 lays out the framework used for the quantitative analysis and Section 6.2
discusses the data. In Section 6.3 we outline our calibration strategy and provide a survey of
the relevant empirical literature. Section 6.4 brieﬂy discusses our computational approach of
equilibria, with most of the details are relegated to the Appendix. In Section 6.5 we present
the main equilibrium implications, in particular the model’s implications for the life-cycle
proﬁle of human capital investment and insurance. Section 6.6 considers an extension of the
model with risk heterogeneityand Section 6.7 analyzes a versionof the model without the life-
cycle. Section 6.8 presents our policy experiment, namely a reform of the bankruptcy code.
We also conducted an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the main parameters
of the model, but do not report the results here because of space limitations – details are
21available on request.
6.1 Set-Up
In this section, we consider a version of the model with ex-ante heterogeneity in human
capital returns due to age-diﬀerences. We further focus on two types of human capital risk:
mortality risk and labor market risk. The mortality risk we have in mind is the risk that
an adult member of a multi-person household dies and the household continues to exists,
leading to a loss in human capital and labor income available to the household (measured
in equivalence units that adjust for the change in household-size). Labor market risk refers,
for example, to the loss of ﬁrm- or occupation-speciﬁc human capital in the case of job
displacement. Internal promotions and upward movement in the labor market provide two
examples of positive human capital “shocks” related to the labor market.
We let the length of a time period be one year and consider a version of the general
framework with exogenous state st = (s1t,s2t,s3t). The ﬁrst component of st denotes
age, the second component represents mortality risk discussed above, and the third com-
ponent subsumes all of labor market risk. We assume that the second and third compo-
nent, s2 and s3, are independently distributed over time, but allow for an age-dependence
of the distribution: π(s2,t+1,s3,t+1|s2,t,s3,t) = π(s2,t+1,s3,t+1) and π(s2t,s3t|s1t) = π(s2t|s1t) ∗
π(s3t|s1t)  = π(s2t)∗π(s3t). The age-component can take on the values s1t ∈ {23,...,60,pre−
retirement,retirement,death}. From age 23 to 60, the household is working and the tran-
sition from one age-group to the next is deterministic: π(j + 1|j) = 1 for j = 23,...,60.
Households in pre-retirement age also work, but the duration of this phase of life ends
stochastically with retirement. The retirement probability is chosen so that retirement oc-
curs on average at age 65. Finally, retired households die stochastically, in which case they
have reached the absorbing state s1t = death and are replaced by a new-born household of
age 23. For the preference shifter in (2) we assume ν(s1 = death) = 0 and ν(s1) = 1 for all
s1  = death.
22We assume that the human capital depreciation rate can be decomposed as follows:
δh(s1t,s2t,s3t) = ¯ δh(s1t) + η(s1,s2t) + ξ(s3t). The age-dependent mean, ¯ δh(s1t), determines
the expected human capital return of a household of age s1 through rh − ¯ δh(s1). We use
a parsimonious speciﬁcation for the life-cycle schedule and assume that the function ¯ δh(.)
is a fourth-order polynomial. We assume that the second term can take on two values,
s2t ∈ {b,g}, where s2t = b denotes the bad shock that a member of the household dies and
s2t = g denotes the good shock that the death-event does not occur. We assume that the
size of the human capital loss if s2t = b is independent of age: η(s1,b) = η(b). However, we
allow the death probabilities to be age-dependent, and choose the realizations η(s1,g) < 0
so that η is a random variable with mean zero.
Finally, ξ(s3) represents labor market risk. We assume that the human capital shocks due
to labor market risk are log-normally distributed, ln(1+rh−¯ δh(s1)+ξ) ∼ N( (s1)−σ2/2,σ2).
The assumption that human capital shocks are independently and log-normally distributed
is also made by Huggett et al. (2011). In our setting, it has the advantage that it leads to
a stochastic process of earnings that is consistent with the speciﬁcation of a large number
of empirical papers on labor market risk (see below). Note that the mean of human capital
returns is increasing in   and independent of σ, whereas the variance of human capital
returns is independent of   and increasing in σ.11
Our choice to match the basic life-cycle facts only up to age 60 follows Huggett et al.
(2011) and is motivated by several considerations. First, the number of households for each
age-group in our SCF-sample drops rapidly after age 60. Second, labor force participation
falls near the traditional retirement age for reasons that are not modelled here. Third, the
closer we get to the traditional retirementage, the more important non-negativity constraints
on human capital investment become. By ﬁtting the empirical life-cycle of earnings and
wealth only up to age 60 and introducing a transition-group of households with stochastic








23retirement, we can ensure that for the calibrated model economy the optimal choice of human
capital investment is non-negative over the entire life-cycle.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, f(˜ k) = A ˜ Kα. The computa-
tion of equilibria is based on the characterization results in proposition 1 and proposition 2.
See the Appendix for more details on our computational approach.
6.2 Data
Data on earnings, ﬁnancial wealth, and life-insurance are drawn from the 6 surveys of the
Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) conducted between 1992 and 2007. In the Appendix,
we discuss in more detail the data, deﬁnition of variables, and sample selection. Here we
only mention that the survey provides information about ”families” corresponding to our
concept of a household, and that we include single-person households as well as multi-person
households in our basic sample. However, we also considered the the sub-sample of multi-
person households, but the results for the empirical life-cycle proﬁle of earnings, earnings
growth, and wealth-to-earnings ratio were almost unchanged. For the case of life-insurance,
we discuss below (Section 6.5.4) the eﬀect of sample selection criteria on the empirical life-
cycle proﬁle. Household age refers to the age of the household head. The model variable
”ﬁnancial wealth” is associated with the variable ”net worth” in the SCF, which is the value
of all assets (excluding human capital) minus the value of all debt.
Our life-cycle proﬁles of earnings and earnings growth in Figures 1 and 2 are constructed
as follows. We ﬁrst compute median household earnings for each age group and survey
(calendar time) using a centered 5-year age bin, and then remove possible time eﬀects using
time dummies as in Huggett et al. (2011).12 This gives us a life-cycle proﬁle of median
earnings, which we smooth using a third-order polynomial. Finally, we compute from this
smoothed life-cycle proﬁle of median earnings a life-cycle proﬁle of earnings growth rates.
For the life-cycle of ratio variables plotted in Figure 3 (wealth-to-earnings ratio) and Figure
12We have also used cohort-dummies, with similar results.
247 (ratio of insurance face value to income loss), we compute the median of the ratio variable,
but the results are very similar when computing the ratio of the median of the respective
variables.
6.3 Calibration
We now discuss the targets used to calibrate the model and the resulting parameter values.
6.3.1 Bankruptcy Code
We assume that bankruptcy leads to an exclusion from ﬁnancial markets for 7 years, but
no loss of earnings, p = 1/7 and τh = 0. In comparison, Chatterjee et al. (2007) use
p = 1/10 and τh = 0, and Livshits et al. (2007) choose no exclusion period beyond the
period of default, but also introduce additional cost of bankruptcy. In all these papers,
there are no insurance markets, and therefore no cost of bankruptcy that relates to the
loss of access to insurance markets. In contrast, we assume that households in default are
excluded from participation in credit and insurance markets, and in this sense we assume a
harsher punishment of default than the previous literature. Krueger and Perri (2006) assume
p = +∞ for technical reasons, but also allow defaulting households to save.13
6.3.2 Mortality Risk
We calibrate the ﬁrst component of human capital risk, η, as follows. We choose the proba-
bility that an adult member of the household dies so that we match the year-to-year average
survival rates for the period 1991-2000 for the US life-tables for the respective age-group.
The size of the negative human capital shock in the case of the death of a household member
is set to η(b) = 0.20, that is, 20 percent of the human capital of a household is lost.
A value of η(b) = 0.20 is in line with the evidence presented in Weaver (2010), who
13Our model abstracts from a number of aspects of consumer default, and calibration of the parameter
p is therefore subject to a fair amount of uncertainty. In this sense, one could argue that p, respectively
τh, should be treated as a free parameter that is chosen to match a particular dimension of the data, an
approach taken by Livshits et al. (2007).
25reports projections based on a micro-simulation model. More speciﬁcally, Weaver (2010)
reports that the median of the of the ratio of income of a widow to income of the couple
before widowhood is expected to be between 0.61 and 0.63 depending on the birth cohort,
where income includes social security payments but excludes any asset income (see table 6
in Weaver (2010)).14 Given that the current paper deals with insurance provided by private
markets, it seems reasonable to use as target the income loss after social security payments
(public transfer payments) have been taken into account. Based on the equivalence scale
used for the oﬃcial US poverty threshold, a household of size n−1 needs 78% of the income
of an n-person household independent of household size n. Thus, an income value of .62
translates into an equivalent income of 0.62/0.78 = 0.80 of the income before widowhood,
which amounts to an eﬀective income drop of 20 percent.
There are two reasons why the value of 20 percent overstates the eﬀective income loss for
the typical household. First, Weaver (2010) and related studies focus on a group of house-
holds for which the surviving adult satisﬁes the eligibility requirements for Social Security
widow beneﬁts, a group that is more at risk than the typical US household. Second, by
using the Oﬃcial US Equivalence Scale, we have used equivalence weights that lead to the
largest decline in living standard for the same drop in family income. For example, if we use
the OECD Equivalence Weights, the implied drop in eﬀective income is signiﬁcantly smaller
that 20 percent.
6.3.3 Labor Market Risk
In our baseline calibration, we choose the value of the variance parameter, σ2, of the second
component of human capital risk, ξ, based on the estimation results reported in Huggett
et al. (2011), who ﬁnd σ2 = 0.0123 (a standard deviation of .11). To see how the model’s
earnings process with σ2 = 0.0123 relates to the empirical ﬁndings of the extensive literature
on labor market risk, note that labor income is given by yht = rhht. Thus, earnings growth
14Holden and Brand (2003) ﬁnd an income drop of very similar magnitude based on a sample of widowed
women in the PSID data.
26rates are equal to human capital growth rates: yh,t+1/yh1 = ht+1/ht. Changes in human













If θh is close to one, which is the case for young households, then we can use the approx-
imation 1 + r(θ,s) ≈ 1 + rh − δh(s). In this case, we ﬁnd:
lnyh,t+1 − lnyht = gt + ǫt (18)





2 , and stochastic innovation term ǫt ∼ N(0,σ2).15 The random walk speciﬁcation is
often used by the empiricalliterature to model the permanent component of labor income risk
with the additional assumption that the innovation term is normally distributed. Estimates
of the variance of this innovation term, σ2, usually range from .0225 (Carroll and Samwick
(1997)) to .0361 (Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)) up to .0625 (Storesletten et al. (2004)), where
we averaged over age-groups and, if applicable, over business cycle conditions. However,
these values will overstate the true value of σ2 if there is earnings proﬁle heterogeneity in
addition to stochastic shocks with a permanent component, which is the reason why we
follow Huggett et al. (2011) and use the smaller value of σ2 = 0.0123.16
Inference about the parameters governing labor market risk crucially depends on the
15We have ǫt instead of ǫt+1 in equation (18), and the latter is the common speciﬁcation for a random
walk. However, this is not a problem if the econometrician observes the idiosyncratic depreciation shocks
with a one-period lag. In this case, (18) is the correct equation from the household’s point of view, but a
modiﬁed version of (18) with ǫt+1 replacing ǫt is the speciﬁcation estimated by the econometrician.
16There are also reasons why the model might understate the true amount of human capital risk. For
example, if we use ln(1+r(θ,s)) instead of ln(1+rh−δht) in (18), we would need to choose a higher value for
σ2 to match the same variance of labor income changes (see also Krebs, 2003). Further, the assumption that
earnings innovations are (log)-normally distributed is likely to understate the true amount of human capital
risk if, as the evidence indicates (Geweke and Keane, 2000), the actual distribution of earnings innovations
has a fat lower tail.
27degree to which life-cycle proﬁles of earnings are heterogeneous. More specifcally, the em-
pirical literature on labor income risk can be broadly divided into two strands: one that,
after controlling for observable characteristics, assumes that income proﬁles are homoge-
neous (MacCurdy (1982)) and one that assumes heterogeneity of income proﬁles (Lillard
and Weiss (1979)). The ﬁrst strand usually ﬁnds a large random walk component or at least
a highly persistent component close to a random walk, whereas the second strand often ﬁnds
that the estimated persistence parameter signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the random walk speci-
ﬁcation. For example, Guvenen (2007) ﬁnds that the estimated auto-correlation coeﬃcient
drops from 0.988 to 0.821 after income heterogeneity has been taken into account. However,
based on Monte Carlo simulations, Hryshko (2009) ﬁnds that the random walk hypothesis
cannot be rejected. Meghir and Pistaferri (2010) suggest that these two theories might not
be mutually exclusive: when Baker and Solon (2003) estimate the parameters of a general-
ized earnings process that allows for proﬁle heterogeneity, a random walk component, and a
transitory component modeled as an AR(1), they ﬁnd that the variance of the random walk
component is precisely estimated and substantial, though smaller than the estimate when
no earnings proﬁle heterogeneity is allowed.
6.3.4 Expected Returns
We use an annual risk-free rate of rf = 3%. In comparison, Kaplan and Violante (2010)
choose the same value and Huggett et al. (2011) and Krueger and Perri (2006) choose an
annual risk-free rate of four percent, but also allow for capital income taxation.17 We use the
observed life-cycle proﬁle of mean earnings to infer the life-cycle proﬁle of expected human
capital returns as follows.












1 + θh(s1,t−1)(rh − ¯ δh(s1,t−1)) + (1 − θh(s1,t−1))rf
￿
(19)
17Using real ﬁnancial returns as a proxy for physical capital returns, anything between 1% (T-bills) and
7 % (stocks) seems defensible and has been used in the literature.
28For given portfolio choice, (19) shows that an increase in expected human capital return,
rh − ¯ δh(s1), increases the earnings growth rate. For our calibrated model economy, this
relationship still holds once we take into account the endogenous response of the portfolio
choice. Thus, we can use (19) in conjunction with the life-cycle proﬁle of earnings growth
to identify the life-cycle proﬁle of expected human capital returns, which is the approach
taken here. More precisely, we choose the coeﬃcients of the fourth-order polynomial ¯ δh(.) in
order to minimize the distance (L2-norm) between the empirical life-cycleof median earnings
growth from age 23 to age 60 and the corresponding model prediction.18 Figures 1 and 2
show the life-cycle proﬁle of median earnings and median earnings growth in the data and
according to the model, where the match between data and model is almost perfect even
though we restricted the depreciation schedule to a fourth-order polynomial. Note that our
life-cycle proﬁle of median earnings is very similar to the life-cycle reported in Huggett et
al. (2011), who use individual earnings data drawn from the PSID.
By drawing inference about human capital returns from the life-cycle proﬁle of median
earnings, we follow a long tradition in human capital theory. In most of the previous work,
for example Porath (1967) and more recently Huggett et al. (2011), human capital returns
decline with age because there are diminishing returns at the micro-level and the level of
human capital is increasing with age. In contrast, in our approach human capital returns are
decreasing with age because human capital investment is less productive for older households.
In either approach, however, young households have a very strong incentive to invest in
human capital since the expected returns to this investment are high.
6.4.5 Preferences and Production
We follow Huggett et al. (2011) and assume a capital share in output, α, of .32. We
choose the remaining parameters β (annual discount factor), A (productivity), δk (capital
depreciation rate), and pd (probability of death of retired household) so that we match given
18The depreciation rate for households in the transition period, ¯ δh(pre−retirement), is chosen to be equal
to the implied depreciation rate for a households age 62.5.
29values of i) the aggregate capital-to-output ratio, ii) the real interest rate, iii) the life-cycle
average of the median of the ratio of ﬁnancial wealth to labor income for the age-group
23 − 60, and iv) the average human capital return for the age group 23 − 60. For the
aggregate capital-to-output ratio, we follow Huggett et al. (2011) and use a value of 2.95.
The average of the median of the ratio of ﬁnancial wealth to labor income in the data is
equal to 2.5 for the age-group 23 − 60. For the real interest rate we use 3 percent and for
the average human capital return a value of 6 percent.
6.4 Computation
The computation of equilibria is based on proposition 2, that is, we compute intensive-form
stationary recursive equilibria. To do this, we start with an aggregate capital-to-labor ratio,
˜ K, which deﬁnes the rental rates rk and rh, and solve the intensive-form household problem
(12). Given the solution to the household problem, we compute a stationary relative wealth
distribution, Ω, using (14). We use this Ω to compute a new ˜ K and iterate over ˜ K until
the market clearing condition (13) holds. A detailed description of our solution method for
solving the household problem (12) can be found in the Appendix.
6.5 Results: Life-Cycle Implications
6.5.1 Portfolio Choice
The portfolio mix between human and ﬁnancial capital is measured by θh, the fraction of
total wealth invested in human capital. Empirically, we can measure (net) ﬁnancial wealth
and the payoﬀ to human capital holdings, namely labor income. Thus, we use the ratio
of ﬁnancial wealth to labor income, which in the model is given by
1−θh
rhθh , as our empirical
measure of the portfolio choice of a households. Figure 3 shows the life-cycle proﬁle of this
ratio in the SCF data and according to the model. Clearly, the model provides a very good
account of the this dimension of the data. In particular, the model matches well the observed
increase in ﬁnancial wealth relative to human wealth over the life-cycle, even though it has
not been calibrated to match this target. In other words, one basic prediction of the theory,
30namely that households with high expected human capital returns should be heavily invested
in human capital, is qualitatively and quantitatively supported by the empirical evidence.
6.5.2 Consumption Insurance
We ﬁrst consider the model’s implication for the life-cycle variation of consumption insur-
ance based on the insurance measure I2 = 1 − σc/σc,a (see our deﬁnition in Section 5). The
ﬁgure shows that insurance increases substantially with age. For example, the value of this
insurance measure begins at 0.24 for households age 23 and increases to 0.81 for households
age 60. Further, the lack of consumption insurance for young households is signiﬁcant in
welfare terms. To see this, we plot in Figure 5 the welfare consequences of this lack of insur-
ance. More precisely, for each age group we compute the welfare gain of removing/insuring
all risk assuming that the mean level of consumption remains the same, that is, we keep
the portfolio choices ﬁxed. The welfare gains shown in Figure 5 are expressed in percentage
of lifetime consumption (consumption equivalent variation). Clearly, these gains are sub-
stantial. For example, for a household age 23 the welfare gain from perfect consumption
insurance is about 4% of lifetime consumption. In comparison, Lucas (2003) ﬁnds, for the
same preferences, welfare cost of aggregate consumption ﬂuctuations that are less than 0.1
percent of lifetime consumption. In other words, the welfare cost of under-insurance of id-
iosyncratic human capital risk in our current heterogeneous-agent model are much larger
than the cost of business cycle ﬂuctuations in a corresponding representative-agent model.
6.5.3 Consumption Inequality
Here we compare the model’s implication for consumption dispersion over the life-cycle
with the pattern found in the US data. Figure 6 plots the variance of log adult-equivalent
consumption in the US data (Consumer Expenditure Survey) from three studies, Aguiar
and Hurst (2008), Deaton and Paxson (1994), and Primciceri and van Rens (2009), and the
corresponding variance implied by the model. The ﬁgure shows that the model captures
the increase in consumption dispersion observed in the data. Indeed, the model matches
31quite well the estimates of consumption dispersion reported by Aguiar and Hurst (2008), in
particular the concave shape of the life-cycle proﬁle of consumption dispersion. Note that
these estimates are very similar to the one found in Heathcote et al. (2010).
The theoretical life-cycle proﬁle of consumption dispersion depicted in Figure 6 is very
similar to the life-cycle proﬁle implied by the incomplete-market model analyzed in Huggett
et al. (2010). In other words, the two human capital models, one with exogenous incomplete
markets and one with complete markets and endogenous borrowing constraints, make very
similar prediction with respect to this particular dimension of the data. We now turn to the
analysis of another dimension of the data that is more informative for distinguishing between
these two approaches, namely the purchase of life insurance contracts. By construction,the
standard incomplete market model is silent about this dimension of the data, whereas the
limited enforcement model makes a sharp prediction about the relationship between risk
exposure and purchase of insurance contracts.
6.5.4 Life Insurance
Consider the event ”death of a household member”. As in the example of Section 5, we
deﬁne a measure of insurance as the ratio of insurance pay-out to income loss, I1. How-
ever, in the current version of the model, we also have labor market risk, and we there-
fore average over human capital shocks due to labor market risk by using E[θa|s1,s2 =
b] − E[θa|s1] in the numerator of I1. In order to construct an empirical proxy for I1, note
that (E[θa|s1,s2 = b] − E[θa|s1])x is the value of insurance pay-outs in the case of death,
and η(b)θh(s1)x is the value of the human capital loss. In the SCF data, we have detailed
information about the size of the life insurance holdings and the corresponding insurance
pay-out in the case of death (the face value of the contract), which provides us with an esti-
mate of (E[θa|s1,s2 = b] − E[θa|s1])x. For the human capital loss, η(b)θh(s1)x , we compute
a measure of the present value of labor income lost as the product of current labor income,
times a present value factor, times our value for η(b). The present value factor, in turn,
is deﬁned as the present value of one dollar that grows according to the life-cycle proﬁle
32of median earnings depicted in Figure 1, where we use the inter-temporal marginal rate of
substitution, ˜ β (ct+1/ct)
−1, of the relevant age-group to discount future earnings.
In Figure 7 we show the life-cycle variation of the insurance measure I1 in the data
and according to the model. For the data, we show the insurance measure for two diﬀerent
samples: one sample including all households and one sample that is restricted to households
that have purchased some life insurance. Clearly, in the data this insurance measure increases
with age, where the increase in much more pronounced for the sample of all households.
The model also generates a substantial increase of insurance with age and ﬁts the data
almost perfectly when we restrict ourselves to the sample of households with some life-
insurance. However, for the sample of all households, the slope is much steeper than the slope
predicted by the model. In other words, insurance purchase has an extensive margin and an
intensive margin, and the data indicate that both margins are important for understanding
life insurance. The model predicts very well the intensive margin, but it misses the extensive
margin since in the equilibrium of the model all households purchase a positive amount of
life insurance.
We have considered various changes in our sample selection criteria to analyze the ro-
bustness of our empirical result. For example, we restricted the sample to multi-person
households and multi-person households with children, and also conditioned on education.
Figure 8 shows the results and reveals the robustness of two important features of the data:
insurance increases with age and this increase is much stronger if we do not condition on
participation in the insurance market. Further, the slopes of the life-cycle plots are surpris-
ingly similar for the sample of all households, the sample of multi-person households, and the
sample of multi-person households with children. In other words, multi-person households
with children are better insured than single-person households, but the increase of insurance
with age is not so diﬀerent from the increase observed for single-person households. The
results for education are very similar and not shown here. Finally, we used diﬀerent ways of
computing the present value of lost earnings. For example, we used diﬀerent values of η(b)
33and also the risk-free rate to discount future earnings. The former had mainly the eﬀect of
shifting the age-insurance proﬁle and the ladder of making the proﬁle steeper.
To better understand the extensive margin in the data, we plot in Figure 9 the life-
cycle pattern of the participation rate in the life-insurance market, that is, the fraction of
households who have purchased some life-insurance. Figure 9 shows that participation rates
increase until around age 45 and and remain roughly constant. Further, the initial increase
in the participation rate is substantial. In the next section, we consider an extension of
the model that incorporates this extensive margin and replicates the pattern of insurance for
both the sample of all households and the sample of households that hold some life-insurance.
6.6 Extension: Heterogeneity in Mortality Risk
Our previous analysis of mortality risk allows for age-dependent death probabilities, but
assumes that the size of the income loss, η(b), is the same for all households independent of
age or other characteristics. In this section, we introduce heterogeneityin these income losses.
For example, eﬀective income losses in the event “death of a household member” depend on
family structure, and that family structure may change. More formally, we assume that that
of all the households with a head aged 23, a fraction (1 − π(23)) have a value η(b) = 0 and
the remaining π(23) households have a value η(b) that is drawn from a uniform distribution
with support [η1,η2], where η1 > 0. Households with η(b) > 0 buy life-insurance, and π(23)
is therefore the participation rate of households age 23. This age-dependent participation
rate, π(age), increases with age for the following reason. Households who have η(b) > 0 will
keep their value until retirement, but for households with η(b) = 0, there is a positive (and
generally age-dependent) probability in each period that they draw a new value η(b) > 0
from the uniform distribution with support [η1,η2], and then keep that new value forever.
The heterogeneity in mortality risk introduces an additional source of heterogeneity in
household choice. More precisely, the current portfolio choice of an individual household,
θ, now depends on current age and the current value of η(b). Keeping in mind that there
34are now two components of the exogenous state that have predictive power, the deﬁnition
of stationary recursive equilibrium of Section 4 can be applied without modiﬁcation.19
We calibrate the underlying parameters of the distribution of mortality risk as follows.
The median value of η(b) for the sample of households who participate in the insurance
market is simply the median value of the given uniform distribution: ηm,p = .5∗(η2−η1)+η1.
We require this median value to be 0.2 as in the previous calibration. The median value
of η(b) for the entire sample of all households is given by ηm,all(age) = (π(age) − 0.5) ∗
(η2 − η1) + η1. Note that the former median value is independent of age, whereas the latter
increases with age. The function π = π(age) can be estimated from our data on participation
rates in the life-insurance market (see Figure 10). Using this function and the restriction
.5 ∗ (η2 − η1) + η1 = 0.2, we ﬁnd the following formula: ηm,all(age) = .4 ∗ π(age) + ¯ η, where
¯ η is a constant that depends on the underlying distributional parameters. We choose ¯ η to
match the life insurance of households age 25 in the data. All other calibration targets are
chosen as in the previous analysis.
The results can be summarized as follows. The choices of individual households with
respect to their portfolio holdings and insurance of labor market risk are only mildly aﬀected
by diﬀerences in η(b). As a result, the implications of the calibrated model economy with
additional heterogeneity in mortality risk for the main macroeconomic variables and the
life-cycle proﬁle of human capital investment and consumption insurance (Figures 3-6) are
almost identical to the implications of the benchmark model discussed before. However,
the implications for the life insurance market diﬀer substantially. More speciﬁcally, the
extended model implies the same age-insurance relationship for households participating in
the life insurance market, but makes a very diﬀerent prediction for the entire sample of all
households.
Figure 10 plots the life-cycle proﬁle of life-insurance coverage according to the model
19Formally, we can think of s1 = (s11,s12) in our general formulation of Section 4, with s11 denoting age
and s12 indexing mortality risk.
35and in the data for the two samples of households. It shows that the model is successful
in matching the data for both sets of households, those who participate and those who
do not. Put diﬀerently, the extended model matches both the intensive and the extensive
margin of observed choices. Note that our insurance measure has the shock size, η(b), in the
denominator, and that for the one plot (data and model) we use ηm,all(b) = .2 and for the
other plot (again data and model) we use ηm,p(age).
6.7 The Importance of the Life-Cycle
Here we present the equilibrium implications of a model without life-cycle variations in
expected human capital returns: ¯ δh(s1) = ¯ δh. We keep all other assumptions unchanged and
choose the calibration targets as follows. We choose the human capitals shocks, η and ξ, as
before. We choose the parameter value ¯ δh to be equal to the mean of ¯ δh(s1) in our previous
calibration, which ensures that we have “on average” the same technology for producing
human capital. We choose the remaining parameters β, A, and δk to match i) a real interest
rate of 3%, ii) an aggregate capital-to-labor ratio of 2.95, and iii) an earnings growth rate
that equals the average growth rate of households age 23 to 60 implied by our previous
analysis.
For the calibrated model economy without age-dependent human capital returns, we ﬁnd
that consumption insurance is close to perfect: I1 = .96 and I2 = .78. Moreover, the
welfare gain from removing all risk, mortality risk and labor market risk, is 0.4 percent of
lifetime consumption. This result underscores the importance of ex-ante heterogeneity for
our analysis. Without this heterogeneity, the consumption and welfare eﬀects of limited
contract enforcement are substantially smaller.
6.8 Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Regulation
In this section, we analyze the consequences of a policy reform that makes bankruptcy more
costly. Speciﬁcally, we consider an experiment in which the bankruptcy code is changed
to make the consequences for a consumer of declaring bankruptcy similar to those for de-
36faults on student loans, which allow for the garnishment of up to 15% of labor income.
That is, as a result of the policy change, τh is increased from zero to 0.15. Other authors
have conducted related policy experiments in models of consumer bankrupcty where access
to insurance markets has been exogenously prohibited and hence where bankrupcty is the
only form of insurance available (for example, Chatterjee et al. 2007 and Livshits et al.
2007). In these worlds, tougher sanctions against consumers declaring bankrupcty restricts
insurance possibilities. By contrast, our focus is on the extent to which access to insurance
will endogenously increase following the imposition of tougher sanctions on consumers in
bankrupcty.
Garnishment of wages in default allows households to borrow more to invest in human
capital, and to buy more insurance against human capital risk. As a result of allowing
garnishment of 15 percent in labor income, there is an increases in aggregate human capital
investment resulting in a very small decline in the returns to human capital investment and
a forty basis point increase in the risk free rate. Everything else equal, this rise in the risk
free rate beneﬁts older households at the expense of the highly leveraged young households.
The growth rate of the economy increases slightly from 1.1 to 1.2 per-cent per year.
Despite the modest aggregate eﬀects of allowing a relatively modest level of wage garnish-
ing, the microeconomic eﬀects of the policy change are often large. Prior to the reform, the
average level of debt to income in our economy averaged 34% for households aged between
23 and 60, which is somewhat larger than the corresponding value of unsecured consumer
debt in the US data, but less than the ratio of consumer debt to income once durable goods
and housing are included. After the policy reform, debt to income levels more than double,
with particularly large increases observed for the youngest households.
The consequences of the policy reform for insurance against human capital risk also vary
signiﬁcantly across households. As shown in Figure 4, prior to the reform, our measure
of consumption insurance varied from roughly 25% for households with a head aged 23 to
more than 80% for households with heads aged 60. Averaging across these households, our
37consumption insurance measure was 51.3%. Following the policy reform this number rises by
more than ten percent to 57%. Households with a head aged 61 and above were already highly
insured against consumption ﬂuctuations, and so looking at the average across the entire
population aged 23 and above the policy reform produced a rise in the level of consumption
insurance of just under ten per-cent. Similar eﬀects are observed for life insurance.
As a measure of welfare, we compute the equivalent variation of the policy reform mea-
sured in units of lifetime consumption. An unweighted average of these estimates across all
households aged 23 to 60 reveals that welfare increased by 0.63% of lifetime consumption.
Almost the exact same number is found if we compute the (common) change in all house-
holds lifetimes consumption required to generate an equivalent level of population weighted
utilitarian social welfare to that generated under the policy change. Almost all of this gain
in welfare is due to the direct insurance eﬀect, that is, the increases in the growth rate
experiences by most households is so small that its impact on welfare is relatively small.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a tractable macroeconomic model in which households accumu-
late human capital that is both idiosyncratically risky and non-pledgeable against consumer
debt. We used the framework to analyze the possible causes and consequences of under-
insurance. The results of this paper suggest three lines of future research.
The ﬁrst concerns the measurement of the extent of insurance against the various forms
of human capital risk. In the paper, we restricted the attention to insurance against one
form of human capital risk – the death of a family member – for three reasons. First, it is
one of the most important – in the sense of a large shock size – forms of human capital risk.
Second, it is a readily quantiﬁable risk for which other market imperfections, such as adverse
selection, are likely to be less important. Third and ﬁnally, it is a type of human capital risk
for which an insurance market exists that has a relatively simple structure. Future research
on the observed lack of insurance against human capital risk needs to quantify the extent of
38under-insurance coming from diﬀerent sources.
A second line of research concerns the extent of unobserved heterogeneity in returns to
human capital across the population. Heterogeneity of human capital returns due to ability
diﬀerences has been central to the work by, among others, Guvenen et al. (2011), Hugget
et al (2011), and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005). In the current paper, we restricted
attention to diﬀerences in returns by age, and argued that this dimension of heterogeneity
can go a long way towards explaining a number of empirical facts about human capital choice
and under-insurance. An important task for future research is to determine the extent to
which additional heterogeneity is important in explaining additional empirical facts about
human capital choice, borrowing, and insurance.
Finally, a third line of research would broaden the the set of assets available to households.
The most important alternative asset is housing, which is also risky and which is, to varying
degrees, partially collateralizable. All else equal, the perceived (utility) rates of return to
housing investment are large, so that access to this asset will further strengthen the results
of this paper: households would like to borrow to invest in housing and human capital, and
these investment opportunities will compete with the need to purchase insurance. To what
extent this eﬀect is oﬀset by the fact that some housing wealth can be used as collateral
against borrowing remains an open quantitative question.
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42Figure 1: Life-cycle proﬁle of log labor income










Notes: Life-cycle proﬁle of median of log labor income for
households age 23-60 from the SCF, surveys 1992-2007. The
red points show the data and the red dashed line a polynomial
ﬁt of the data points.
Figure 3: Life-cycle proﬁle of portfolio choice











Notes: Life-cycle proﬁle of the median of the ratio of ﬁnancial
wealth (value of all assets minus value of all debt) relative to
labor income for households age 23-60. The red points show
the data and the blue solid line the model prediction.
Figure 2: Life-cycle proﬁle of labor income growth











Notes: Life-cycle proﬁle of the growth rate of labor income for
households age 23-60. The red dashed line shows the smoothed
data proﬁle derived from ﬁgure 1 and the solid blue line the
model ﬁt.
Figure 4: Life-cycle proﬁle of consumption insur-
ance







Notes: Life-cycle proﬁle of consumption insurance in the
model. The insurance measure is one minus the ratio of the
standard deviation of consumption in equilibrium relative to
the standard deviation of consumption in ﬁnancial autarky.Figure 5: Life-cycle proﬁle of welfare cost of
under-insurance








Notes: Welfare cost of under-insurance expressed in percent-
age of life-time consumption.
Figure 7: Life-cycle proﬁle of life insurance












Notes: Life-cycle proﬁle of the ratio of the median value of
life insurance (insurance pay-out) to the median value of the
permanent income loss. The median permanent income loss
in the data is the product of median current income times
present value factor times the fraction of income lost by the
median household, which is assumed to be constant at 20%.
The pink crosses show the data for the entire sample and
the red points for the subsample of households that have
purchased life insurance. The solid blue line is the model
prediction.
Figure 6: Life-cycle proﬁle of consumption in-
equality







Notes: Life-cycle proﬁle of the cross-sectional variance of con-
sumption. The blue solid line shows the model prediction. The
red points show the proﬁle estimated by Deaton and Paxson
(1994), the green circles are the estimates of Aguiar and Hurst
(2008), and the crosses are the estimates of Primiceri and van
Rens (2009). The data have been normalized to 0 at age 25.
Figure 8: Life-cycle proﬁle of life insurance for
diﬀerent sample selections








Notes: Life-cycle proﬁle of the ratio of the median value of life
insurance (insurance pay-out) to the median value of the per-
manent income loss. The median permanent income loss is the
product of median current income times present value factor
times the fraction of income lost by the median household. The
red crosses show all households and the red points show the
subsample of households that have purchased life insurance.
The blue squares and diamonds show the same statistics for
the subsample of households that are married or living with a
partner. The pink circles and dots show the same statistics for
the subsample of households that are married or living with a
partner and have kids living in the household. The fraction of
income lost by the median household is constant at 20%.Figure 9: Participation rate in life-insurance mar-
ket









Notes: Life-cycle proﬁle of the participation rate in the life-
insurance market for households age 23-60. For each age the
red star shows the share of households in the SCF that have
positive holdings of life-insurance. The red solid line shows a
polynomial ﬁt to the data.
Figure 10: Life-cycle proﬁle of life insurance (ex-
tended model)









Notes: Life-cycle proﬁle of the ratio of the median value of
life insurance (insurance pay-out) to the median value of the
permanent income loss. The median permanent income loss
is the product of median current income times present value
factor times the fraction of income lost by the median house-
hold. The red crosses show the data for the entire sample
and the red points for the subsample of households that have
purchased life insurance. The blue dashed dotted line is the
model prediction for the entire sample. The blue solid line
is the model prediction for the subsample of households that
have purchased life insurance. The median fraction of income
lost is diﬀerent for the proﬁles. For the red points and the blue
solid line the fraction is constant at 20%. For the red crosses
and the blue dashed dotted line the fraction is increasing in
age as described in the main text.Appendix
A.1 Default value function
Denote by rd(θh,s) = (1+(1−τh)rh−δh(s))θh the investmentreturnof a defaulting household,
which is simply the human capital return times the fraction of wealth invested in human
capital. After the default period, we have θh = 1, but in the period of default we have in
general θh  = 1. The budget constraint of a household in default is x′ = (1 + rd(s′))x − c. In
the period of re-gaining access to ﬁnancial market, a household in default has no ﬁnancial
assets, and we still have θh = 1. Suppose that the expected value function has the functional
form
V




[lnx + ln(1 + rd(1,s))] . (1)
Given (20), it is straightforward to show that the autarky consumption policy function is
linear in wealth, cd = (1 − β)(1 + rd(θh,s))x, and that the autarky value function has the
functional form:
Vd(x,θh,s) = ˜ Vd(s1) +
1
1 − β
[lnx + ln(1 + rd(θh,s))] . (2)
The intensive-form default value function, ˜ Vd, is deﬁned by the recursion





























For given ˜ V e, equation (22) determines uniquely the function ˜ Vd, which in turn pins down
the default value function through (21).
A2. Proof of proposition 1.
Let T be the operator associated with the Bellman equation (9). Adapting the argument
made in Rusticchini (1998), the following result can be shown to hold in our setting:
Lemma Suppose that Vd and V e are continuous functions. Suppose further that there is
a unique continuous solution, V0, to the Bellman equation without participation constraint.
Let T stand for the operator associated with the Bellman equation. Consider the set of con-
tinuous functions BW that are bounded in the weighted sup-norm ||V || . = supx|V (x)|/W(x),
where the weighting function W is given by W(x) = |L(x)|+|U(x)| with U an upper bound
and L a lower bound, and endow this function space with the corresponding metric.∗ Then
∗Thus, BW is the set of all functions, V , with L(x) ≤ V (x) ≤ U(x) for all x ∈ X. For each particular
1i) limn→∞ T nV0 = V∞ exists and is the maximal solution to the Bellman equation (9)
ii) V∞ is the value function, V , of the sequential household maximization problem.
Suppose now that V e has the functional form (20), which implies that Vd has the func-
tional form (21). Clearly, both functions are continuous. Further, it is straightforward to
show that in this case the Bellman equation without participation constraint has a unique
continuous solution, V0, and that this solution has the functional form (11). We now show
that if Vn = T nV0 has the functional form, then the same is true for Vn+1 = TVn. To see
this, note that Vn+1 is deﬁned as



































































n+1 = β(1 + r(θn+1,s))x (5)
cn+1 = (1 − β)(1 + r(θn+1,s))x ,
where the subscript n + 1 indicates step n + 1 in the iteration. Substituting this policy
function into the right-hand-side of (23) shows that Vn+1 has the desired property.
From the lemma we know that V∞ = limn→∞ T nV0 exists and that it is the maximal
solution to the Bellman equation (9) as well as the value function of the corresponding
sequential maximization problem. Since the set of functions with this functional form is a
application of the lemma, it has to be shown that this deﬁnition of the set of candidate value functions is
without loss of generality for certain lower bound, L, and upper bound, U. In our case, the construction of
the lower and upper bound is straightforward.
2closed subset of the set of continuous functions, we know that V∞ has the functional form.
This proves proposition 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
From proposition 1 we know that individual households maximize utility subject to the
budget constraint and participation constraint. Thus, it remains to show that the intensive-
from market clearing condition (13) is equivalent to the market clearing conditions (7) and
the stationary version of the law of motion for Ω is (14).
Let ˜ xt = (1+ rt)xt be the aggregate total wealth in period t after production and depre-
ciation has taken place. The aggregate stock of human capital in period t + 1 is
Ht+1 = E[θh,t+1xt+1] (6)













The second line in (26) uses the equilibrium law of motion for the individual state variable
x, the third line is simply the law of iterated expectations, the fourth line follows from the
fact that the portfolio choices only depend on s1, and the last line is a direct implication of
the deﬁnition of Ω. A similar expression holds for the aggregate stock of physical capital,
Kt+1. Dividing the two expressions proves the equivalence between (7) and (13).
Deﬁne the expected investment return conditional on age, ¯ r(s1t,s1,t+1), as in (14). The






E[(1 + rt+1)˜ xt|s1,t+1]π(s1,t+1)
E[(1 + rt+1)˜ xt]
=
 
s1t E[(1 + rt+1)˜ xt|s1t,s1,t+1]π(s1t|s1,t+1)π(s1,t+1)
 
s1t,s1,t+1 E[(1 + rt+1)˜ xt|s1t,s1,t+1]π(s1t,s1,t+1)
=
 
s1(1 + ¯ r(s1t,s1,t+1))E[˜ xt|s1t]π(s1t)
 
s1t,s1,t+1(1 + ¯ r(s1t,s1,t+1))E[˜ xt|s1t]π(s1t)
=
 
s1t(1 + ¯ r(s1t,s1,t+1))Ω(s1t)
 
s1t,s1,t+1(1 + ¯ r(s1t,s1,t+1))Ω(s1t)
3where the second line uses the equilibrium law of motion for the individual state variable x,
the third line is simply the law of iterated expectations, the fourth line follows from the fact
that portfolio choices only depend on s1 in conjunction with the deﬁnition of ¯ r, and the last
line is a direct implication of the deﬁnition of Ω. Imposing stationarity, Ωt+1 = Ωt, yields
equation (14). This completes the proof of proposition 2 .
A.4. Proof of proposition 3
For each household type s1 ∈ {l,h}, the solution of the household maximization problem (12)
determines the optimal portfolio choice θ(s1) = (θh(s1),θa(s1,.)). Without loss of generality,
assume that both households have some insurance in equilibrium, but not full insurance:
θa(s1,b)  = θa(s1,g) and η(b)θh(s1)  = (θa(s1,b) − E[θa|s1]). In this case, for both types s1
the participation constraint binds if s2 = g and does not bind if s2 = b. If the participation
does not bind, the consumption growth rate must be equal to 1 + rf with log-utility, which
given the consumption rule (10) implies that the portfolio return in the bad state is equal to
the risk-free rate. Adding the budget constraint, we ﬁnd that the optimal portfolio choice,
(θh(s1),θa(s1,.)), is determined by the following three equations:
θh(s1)
 
1 + rh − ¯ δh(s1) − η(b)
 
+ θa(s1,b) = 1 + rf (8)
θh(s1)
 
1 + rh − ¯ δh(s1) − η(g)
 
+ θa(s1,g) = e
−(1−β)(˜ V−˜ Vd)θh(s1)
 









Suppose now that defaulting households keep access to ﬁnancial markets: p = 0. In this
case, we have ˜ V = ˜ Vd, and from the third equation in (27) it follows that θa(s1,g) = 0.





1+rf (1 + rh − ¯ δh(s1) − η(b))
(9)
Clearly, equation (28) shows that θh(h) > θh(l) if ¯ δh(h) < ¯ δh(l). It further follows from
equation (27) that the insurance pay-out is given by:
θa(s1,b) − E[θa|s1] = π(g)
 
1 + rf − θh(s1)(1 + rh − ¯ δh(s1) − η(b))
 
. (10)
Using θh(h) > θh(l), it follows from (28) that θa(h,b)−E[θa|s1 = h] < θa(l,b)−E[θa|s1 = l].
This proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition. A similar argument proves the second part of
proposition 3.
4A.5. Computation
Here we discuss the solution to the household decision problem. With a slight abuse of
notation, denote the age by s1 = j = 23,...,61,r and human capital risk by (s2,s3) = s,
where we interpret the age 61 as the transition period before retirement and the age r as
retirement. In this case, the equation system (12) determining the intensive-form value
function and the optimal portfolio choice becomes










′) + β˜ Vj+1 (11)
for j = 23,...,60 and for j = 61:

















+β(1− pr)˜ V61 + βpr ˜ Vr
with
























= 1 , θ
′
h ≥ 0 ,















for j = 23,...,60 and for j = 61






































1 + rk − δk
= 1 , θ
′
h ≥ 0 ,






























The default intensive-form value function is given by










′)+ βp˜ Vd,j+1 + β(1−p)˜ Vj+1
(12)
5for j = 23,...,60 and for j = 61:

















βp˜ Vd,r + β(1 − p)˜ Vr
 
,
where we imposed rational expectations: ˜ V e = ˜ V . Finally, since retired households only hold




1 − β(1 − pr)
 
ln(1 − (1 − pr)β) +
β(1 − pr)
1 − β(1− pr)
lnβ(1− pr) +
β(1 − pr)




For j = 61, the Bellman equation (30) in conjunction with (31) deﬁne a ﬁxed point
problem, which we solve by iterating over ˜ V61 and ˜ Vd,61 until convergence. For all ages
j = 23,...,60, we solve the Bellman equation backwards starting at j = 60. The portfolio
choice problem for given ˜ Vj and ˜ Vd,j is solved in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, we order the set
of possible shocks, s′, according to shocks size: S = {s1,..., ¯ s}, where ¯ s is the shock for
which the human capital shock is largest. We then ﬁx the number of shocks for which the
participation constraint is binding, that is, we conjecture that the participation constraint
is binding for the ﬁrst k shocks and not binding for the remaining N − k + 1 shocks. Given
this conjecture, the portfolio choice, θj, is the solution to a linear equation system that is
deﬁned by the following equalities
i) participation constraint holds with equality ∀s
′ ∈ S1 (14)
ii) human capital return equals rf ∀s
′ ∈ S2
iii) budget constraint holds
where S1 is the set of shocks for which the participation constraint is binding and S2 the
set of shocks for which it is not binding. Note that equations i)-iii) are always necessary
conditions for an optimum. They are also suﬃcient if two additional conditions, namely that
a) the solution to (33) satisﬁes the participation constraint for all shock realizations and b)
the set S2 has maximal size. We ﬁnd the solution to (33) satisfying these two additional
requirements as follows.
We begin with S2 = S and checks if the solution to (33) satisﬁes condition a), that is,
satisﬁes the participation constraint for all s′ ∈ S. If not, we choose S2 = S \ {¯ s}, where ¯ s
is the maximal element of the ordered set S, and check if the new solution to (33) satisﬁes
6the participation constraint for all s′. We continue this process of eliminating states from
the set S until we reached a point at which the solution to (33) satisﬁes the participation
constraint for all shocks s′ ∈ S.
A.5. Data
The data are for the years 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 drawn from the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) provided by the Federal Reserve Board. The Survey collects
information on a number of economic and ﬁnancial variables of individual families through
triennial interviews, where the deﬁnition of a ”family” in the SCF comes close to the concept
of a ”household” used by the U.S. Census Bureau. See Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1994)
for details about the SCF.
For the sample selection, we follow as closely as possible Heathcote et al. (2010)†. We
restrict the sample to households where the household head is between 23 and 60 years
of age. We drop the wealthiest 1.46% and the poorest 0.5% of households in each year.
Heathcote et al. (2010) show that this step makes the sample more comparable to the PSID
or CEX data. We drop all households that report negative labor income or that report
positive hours worked but have missing labor income or that report positive labor income
but zero or negative hours worked. We compute the average wage by dividing labor income
by total hours worked, and drop in each year households with a wage that is below half the
minimum wage of the respective year. For the data on life-insurance, we restrict the sample
further to households that are married or live with a partner.
For the deﬁnition of variables we follow Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1994). We only
depart from their variable deﬁnitions when considering labor income, where we follow Heath-
cote et al.(2010) and add two-thirds of the farm and business income as additional labor
income. As common in the literature, we associate ﬁnancial wealth in the model with net
worth in the SCF. Households’ net worth includes the cash value of life-insurance as in
Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1994), but does not include the face value of insurance con-
tracts. We associate life-insurance in the model with the face value of life-insurance from the
data. All data has been deﬂated using the BLS consumer price index for urban consumers
(CPI-U-RS). A detailed description of the relevant variables is as follows:
• Assets are the sum of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial assets. The main categories of
non-ﬁnancial assets are cars, housing, real estate, and the net value of businesses
†We use their Sample B for our analysis.
7where the household holds an active interest. Except for businesses all values are
gross positions, i.e. before outstanding debt. The main categories of ﬁnancial assets
are liquid assets, CD, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, cash value of life-insurance, other
managed investment, and assets in retirement accounts (e.g. IRAs, thrift accounts,
and pensions accumulated in accounts.)
• Debt is the sum of housing debt (e.g. mortgages, home equity loans, home equity
lines of credit), credit card debt, installment loans (e.g. cars, education, others), other
residential debt, and other debt (e.g. pension loans).
• Net-worth is the sum of all assets minus all debt.
• Labor income is wages and salaries plus 2/3 of business and farm income.
• Life-insurance is the face value of all term life policies and the face value of all policies
that build up a cash value. The cash value is not part of the life-insurance, but is part
of the ﬁnancial assets of an household.
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